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HILLMAN V. ANDRUS: THE GHOST OF CIVIL POSSESSION 
Ross E. Tuminello* 
This case presents unresolved issues in Louisiana property law 
with respect to acquisitive prescription and possession of 
immovables. Particularly, Hillman requires consideration of the 
relationship, or lack thereof, between the doctrine of civil 
possession and the vice of discontinuity. Although undecided 
definitively by Louisiana courts, the issue has largely been a 
subject of academic discussion among French and Louisiana 
commentators. This case note seeks to identify the solution used by 
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Hillman as well as 
two other possible solutions that have gained academic support.  
I. BACKGROUND  
This case involves a property dispute over the ownership of a 
.94 acre tract of land.1 The parties were record owners of two 
contiguous tracts.2 The plaintiff purchased the northern tract in 
2007.3 The act of sale specifically described the .94 acre tract as 
one of three tracts being conveyed.4 The act of sale also identified 
the property as being located in Evangeline Parish and referenced a 
survey map annexed thereto.5  
                                                                                                             
 *   Juris Doctor and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Paul M. 
Hebert Law Center (2013); B.S., E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana 
State University (2009). I send many thanks to Alexandru-Daniel On for his 
help in addressing these complex property law issues. I would also like to thank 
Camille Meehan and Professor Olivier Moréteau for their translation of French 
legal sources. 
 1. Hillman v. Andrus, 2011-5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/4/11), 63 So. 3d 1164. 
 2. Id. at 1166. 
 3. Id. at 1165. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1172. 
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The defendants purchased the southern tract in 1977.6 The act 
of sale conveyed 2.07 acres of land located in St. Landry Parish.7 
The document included a list of calls and specifically provided that 
“said property being bounded now or formerly as follows: North 
by Bayou DeCannes.”8  
Sometime later, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants were 
encroaching on the .94 acre tract of land.9 He filed the action to 
have the boundary between the two tracts designated as the line 
dividing Evangeline Parish and St. Landry Parish.10 The 
defendants reconvened asserting ownership of the .94 acre tract by 
title or alternatively by thirty-year acquisitive prescription.11 The 
parties agreed that Bayou DeCannes was rerouted to the north from 
its original location some time prior to the defendant’s 
acquisition.12 To prove possession, the defendants claimed that 
they had maintained the property for thirty years and that their 
children had periodically used the land for recreational purposes.13 
However, the record also indicated that in 1981 the defendants 
moved away from their property for six years.14 During this time, 
other individuals lived in the defendants’ home but never entered 
the disputed .94 acre tract.15 
                                                                                                             
 6. In 1994, the defendant purchased an adjacent tract increasing his 
ownership to four acres. The act of sale similarly described the property as lying 
within St. Landry Parish and being bound on the north by Bayou DeCannes. A 
list of calls was likewise provided. 
 7. Id. at 1166. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. The line dividing the two parishes is also the former centerline of 
Bayou DeCannes. 
 11. Id. at 1167. 
 12. Id. at 1166-67. The disputed .94 acre tract was that piece of land bound 
on the south by the former channel of the bayou and on the north by the current 
channel. 
 13. Id. at 1170. 
 14. Id. at 1171. 
 15. Id. The Court did not explore the relationship between these individuals 
and the defendants. However, the language of the opinion appears to treat them 
as precarious possessors. The only mention of these individuals was that “no 
evidence existed regarding the extent these individuals may have ‘possessed’ the 
property during that period.” In any event, they were likewise treated as if they 
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II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The trial court sustained the defendants’ exception of 
prescription for two reasons.16 First, the trial court determined that 
the defendants had acquired ownership of the .94 acre tract by 
thirty year acquisitive prescription.17 Second, the trial court 
concluded that the defendants were entitled to a presumption of 
ownership by virtue of having possessed the tract in excess of one 
year free from vice.18 For these reasons, the trial court declared the 
defendants to be owners of the .94 acre tract and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s suit.19 
The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
determination of acquisitive prescription, concluding that the 
defendants’ possession20 had been tainted by discontinuity.21 The 
Court’s decision rested firmly on the fact that the defendants had 
left their home for six years.22 Critically, the majority found that 
the defendants’ “lack of evidence regarding this period of time” 
precluded a finding of continuous possession for thirty years.23 
The Court then addressed the plaintiff’s demand to fix the 
boundary and the defendants’ alternative argument of ownership 
by title. The Court held that the plaintiff’s title “very clearly 
includes the disputed property.”24 In support of that conclusion, the 
                                                                                                             
 
never stepped foot on the disputed tract. Thus, they remained within the 
defendants’ record boundaries. For that reason, precarious possession analysis 
and eviction analysis are made irrelevant in the context of possessing the 
disputed tract. See id. at 1171. 
 16. Id. at 1167-68. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1168. 
 19. Id. at 1169. The trial court’s acquisitive prescription determination 
rendered it unnecessary to address defendant’s alternative argument of 
ownership by title. 
 20. In fact, the Court questioned whether the defendants ever engaged in 
acts sufficient to support corporeal possession, but simply assumed it as fact for 
the sake of analysis and discussion. Id. at 1170. 
 21. Id. at 1170. 
 22. Id. at 1171. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1172. 
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Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s deed of acquisition referenced 
a survey naming the .94 tract as one of three tracts being sold and 
showing the southern border as the old centerline of Bayou 
DeCannes.25 The Court also pointed to the deficiency of evidence 
presented by the defendants to prove that the disputed tract was 
included within his call list measurements or that his northern 
border fell within Evangeline Parish.26 However, the Court 
declined to “fix”27 the boundary.28 Rather, the Court simply 
recognized that the plaintiff’s title, which designated the southern 
boundary as the old centerline of Bayou DeCannes, was superior to 
the defendants’ title.29  
III. COMMENTARY 
The troubling feature of this opinion is the Court’s 
determination that possession was not continuous during the 
defendants’ six-year absence without any discussion of civil 
possession. Louisiana Civil Code article 3476 provides that 
possession must be continuous. Possession is discontinuous when 
it is not exercised at regular intervals, and possession that is 
discontinuous has no legal effect.30 However, Louisiana Civil 
Code article 3431 instructs that “once acquired, possession is 
retained by the intent to possess as owner [animus domini] even if 
the possessor ceases to possess corporeally.”31 Further, the intent 
to retain possession is presumed unless there is clear proof of a 
contrary intention.32 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1172-73. 
 27. After considering the evidence, including the testimony and exhibits of 
a surveyor or other expert appointed by the court or by a party, the court shall 
render judgment fixing the boundary between the contiguous lands in 
accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties. LA. C.C.P. Art. 
3693. 
 28. Id. at 1173. 
 29. Id. 
 30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3435 and 3436. 
 31. Emphasis added. 
 32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432. 
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As stated in the introductory remarks, legal commentators have 
identified at least three possible solutions to resolve the apparent 
tension between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity. The 
first solution is the traditional French view, which treats the 
doctrine of civil possession and the vice of discontinuity as two 
wholly distinct and separate concepts. This is the solution that the 
court in Hillman appeared to use. The second solution, supported 
by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, recognizes a relationship 
between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity whereby a 
possessors’ animus, sufficient to support civil possession, is 
affected by subsequent acts of corporeal possession or a lack 
thereof. The third solution is the modern French view, which also 
recognizes a relationship between civil possession and the vice of 
discontinuity. Under this view, civil possession requires acts of 
corpus by a precarious possessor in the actual owner or possessor’s 
absence.  
A. The Traditional French View 
Although the Third Circuit in Hillman did not expressly 
identify the position underlying their judgment, the reasoning 
seems to align with the traditional French view. Under that theory, 
as explained by Planiol:  
Possession exists just as soon as its two essential elements, 
the corpus and the animus are united. It, however, can be 
affected by certain vices that make it useless, principally 
for the bringing of possessory actions and for the 
acquisition of ownership by prescription. These two effects, 
which are the principal advantages of possession, are 
attached solely to a possession free of vices (or defects). A 
vice of possession is therefore a certain state of affairs 
which, without destroying possession, makes it juridically 
valueless.33  
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Thus, according to Planiol, the acquisition and maintenance of 
possession, whether it be by corporeal, civil, or constructive 
possession, is a matter wholly independent from the determination 
of whether such possession can result in ownership by acquisitive 
prescription. In that sense, it may very well be that a party satisfies 
the requirements of civil possession. However, for purposes of 
acquisitive prescription, that civil possession remains subject to the 
ordinary vices of possession—namely, discontinuity.  
Broadly speaking, the traditional French view posits that no 
relationship exists between civil possession and the vice of 
discontinuity. Subsequent gaps between acts of corpus sufficient to 
trigger the vice of discontinuity will not then destroy a civil 
possession. Rather, those gaps simply preclude the possibility of 
having civil possession blossom into ownership by prescription. 
This appears to be the view adopted by the court in Hillman, and 
under those facts, the result would appear correct. However, one 
would be apt to question whether the Louisiana Civil Code 
supports the traditional French view. Under Louisiana Civil Code 
article 3476, the possessor must have corporeal possession,34 or 
civil possession preceded by corporeal possession, to acquire a 
thing by prescription. Thus, the Civil Code seems to suggest that 
some relationship exists between civil possession and the vice of 
discontinuity for purposes of acquisitive prescription. 
B. Professor Yiannopoulos’ View 
Professor Yiannopoulos’ view promotes a logical relationship 
between the doctrine of civil possession and the vice of 
discontinuity.35 Again, it is important to note that civil possession 
is the retention of possession solely by the intent to possess as 
owner.36 That intent is presumed in the absence of a clear proof of 
                                                                                                             
 34. Corporeal possession is the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, 
or enjoyment over a thing. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3425. 
 35. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 528 (1991). 
 36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3431. 
 
 
2013] HILLMAN V. ANDRUS 333 
 
a contrary intention.37 On the other hand, possession must be 
continuous for purposes of acquisitive prescription,38 and 
discontinuous possession has no legal effect.39 Referring to these 
principles, Professor Yiannopoulos observes that:  
There is an apparent conflict between the notion of civil 
possession and the requirement that possession be 
continuous. . . . Properly understood, the two sets of 
provisions are fully reconcilable. In the first place, 
continuity of possession is more significant in cases 
involving the issue of whether possession has been 
acquired rather than retained. Second, depending on the 
nature of the property, long intervals in the exercise of 
possession may constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption of retention of possession.40 
There are three main ideas to take away from Professor 
Yiannopoulos’ commentary. First, he recognizes a relationship 
between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity. His view is 
phrased in terms of the affirmative requirement of continuity under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3476. This notion reflects the 
reciprocal paradigm of possession attributes within the Louisiana 
Civil Code. Louisiana Civil Code article 3476 affirmatively 
requires that possession be continuous for purposes of acquisitive 
prescription. Conversely, Louisiana Civil Code article 3435 
provides that discontinuous possession, possession not exercised at 
regular intervals, has no legal effect.  
Following this idea, he recognizes that long intervals in the 
exercise of corpus may be used to prove that the possessor no 
longer has the requisite animus sufficient to support civil 
possession.41 As a result, civil possession would cease altogether 
under Louisiana Civil Code article 3433, which provides that 
                                                                                                             
 37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432. 
 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476. 
 39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3435. 
 40. Yiannopoulos, supra note 35, at 550. 
 41. It should be noted that this view does not purport to require corpus to 
sustain civil possession, but, rather, that corporeal acts are simply used as proof 
of the existence or lack thereof of animus. 
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possession is lost upon a corresponding loss of animus. This is 
precisely the relationship that the Louisiana Civil Code seems to 
suggest when evaluating civil possession sufficient to support 
acquisitive prescription. 
Third, his observations can be understood as altering the 
continuity standard between the successive acts of corpus required 
to obtain corporeal possession and the successive acts of corpus 
required to retain possession through civil possession. Stated 
simply, the continuity standard is relaxed once the possessor has 
acquired corporeal possession and is subsequently attempting to 
lean on civil possession. Thus, under Yiannopoulos’ view, the 
primary issue is how lengthy the gaps in between successive acts 
of corpus can be in order to support civil possession. The issue 
does not lend itself to any black letter rule of law largely due to the 
fact-sensitive nature of possession disputes.42 Nevertheless, there 
is some guidance. 
Article 3444 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that 
the presumption of intent to retain possession existed no longer 
than ten years without “actual possession.”43 However, this article 
was subsequently repealed by the legislature, and the Civil Code 
continues to lack any express limitation on the length of civil 
possession. The reason for removing former article 3444 is 
unclear, but one might speculate that it was intended to 
accommodate current Louisiana Civil Code article 3433. Tracking 
the language of article 3433,44 Professor Yiannopoulos explains 
when civil possession is lost: 
With respect to corporeal things, civil possession is 
presumed to exist and to last until possession is abandoned 
or the possessor is evicted by another person. Like 
ownership, which cannot be lost by non-use, possession 
                                                                                                             
 42. Rathborne v. Hale, 667 So. 2d 1197, 1201. 
 43. Comment (c), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432. Corporeal possession is likely 
the intended equivalent of “actual possession.” 
 44. Possession is lost when the possessor manifests his intention to abandon 
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continues for an indeterminate period of time as civil 
possession. However, civil possession may be affected by 
the vice of discontinuity (abandonment). Possession may be 
maintained by the intent to have the thing as one’s own for 
as long as the thing remains materially at the disposal of the 
possessor (eviction).45 
 Thus, civil possession is extinguished as a consequence of 
either: (1) abandonment,46 or the loss of animus as affected by the 
vice of discontinuity or (2) eviction. The concept of abandonment 
and Yiannopoulos’ view that animus can be destroyed by long 
intervals in the exercise of possession are consistent with the idea 
of civil possession from the Civil Code. “Abandonment is 
predicated on a manifestation of the intent to abandon, which may 
be established in light of objective criteria.” That objective criteria 
includes whether the possessor has exercised sufficient acts of 
possession on the land as determined by the very nature of the land 
in question.  
“The nature of the land or the use to which it is destined 
governs the possession necessary to support prescription.”47 That 
is to say that the nature of the land or the use to which it is destined 
may provide insight into what a “regular interval” is under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3436,48 such that possession does not 
become discontinuous. Under Yiannopoulos’ view, the regular 
intervals between successive acts of corpus necessary to “retain” 




                                                                                                             
 45. Yiannopoulos, supra note 43, at 528. 
 46. Comment (c), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3433. 
 47. McDaniel v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc., 560 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. 
App. 3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Landry, 
558 So.2d 242, 244 (La. 1990).  
 48. “Possession is…discontinuous when it is not exercised at regular 
intervals…” LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3436. 
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C. Modern French View 
In France, a school of thought emerged suggesting that, in 
addition to the intent to possess as owner, possession always 
requires corpus. The physical presence may be accomplished by 
the original possessor or through a precarious possessor.49 In case 
of precarious possession, the original possessor retains possession 
through his intent to possess as owner in addition to the precarious 
possessor’s actual physical presence. This does not mean that 
possession is exercised without corpus. Corpus is exercised by 
someone else. Modern French doctrine has made a very subtle 
distinction between possession solo animo, and discontinuous 
possession: 
One may legitimately believe that the one who possesses 
by his sole intent, animo solo, cannot exert possession in a 
continuous manner, that is to say in all occasions and at all 
moments where it should be continuous. One may also say 
that possession solo animo comes close to discontinuous 
possession. As a matter of fact, it seems that the rule of solo 
animo possession acknowledges that possession may be 
kept even in the absence of acts of possession. This may be 
true, but only in the absence of discontinuity, namely in 
those instances where the owner, once in possession, would 
not have normally accomplished acts of possession, due to 
the nature of the premises and their prevailing use.... 
[I]ntermittent acts do not exclude continuity, provided they 
do not result in a discrepancy that goes against the idea of 
possession, and if they are covered by anterior or 
subsequent acts of possession.50 
Although the argument could be made under the language of 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3431, it is unlikely that the modern 
French view could find support in light of the judicial 
interpretation given to article 3431. It is worth noting, once again, 
                                                                                                             
 49. By “precarious possession” I mean the exercise of possession over a 
thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor (LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 3437). 
 50. Jamel Djoudi, Possession, at no. 49, published in 9 RÉPERTOIRE DE 
DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2012) (citations omitted). 
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that Louisiana Civil Code article 3431 expressly provides that 
“Once acquired, possession is retained by the intent to possess as 
owner even if the possessor ceases to possess corporeally.” Also, 
the Louisiana Civil Code expressly allows that acquisitive 
prescription run in favor of a civil possessor who previously held 
corporeal possession.51  
Louisiana Civil Code article 3429 provides that “possession 
may be exercised by the possessor or by another who holds the 
thing for him and in his name. Thus a lessor possesses through his 
lessee.” However, nowhere in the code or the cases interpreting 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3431 is it required that precarious 
possession support civil possession (solo animo). In fact, quite the 
contrary is indicated throughout. Comment (c) Louisiana Civil 
Code article 3431 is instructive and provides that:  
Civil possession is the retention of the possession of a thing 
merely by virtue of the intent to own it, as when a person, 
without intending to abandon possession ceases to reside in 
a house or on the land which he previously occupied or 
when a person ceases to exercise physical control over a 
movable without intending to abandon possession.52 
Further, acts sufficient to support civil possession are those 
such as payment of taxes or the execution of juridical acts affecting 
the thing, such as a lease. Moreover, vestiges of works, such as the 
ruins of a house, may signify civil possession. These activities 
require no actual presence on the land by anyone and appear to 
indicate that the modern French view is quite different to the 
requirements under the Louisiana Civil Code. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
As a practical matter, in Hillman, the court’s apparent use of 
the traditional French view had a compelling and arguably 
prejudicial effect on the litigation. Generally, the party pleading 
                                                                                                             
 51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476. 
 52. Emphasis added. 
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acquisitive prescription bears the burden of proving all essential 
facts.53 Indeed, in Hillman the court based its judgment on a lack 
of evidence presented by the defendants proving corporeal 
possession during their six-year absence. Had the civil possession 
articles been employed, the defendants would have only needed to 
prove that they had acquired possession of the disputed tract. As a 
result, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving a contrary 
intention by clear proof—a much more burdensome standard than 
a preponderance. Unfortunately for the defendants in Hillman, they 
were left carrying the burden of proof at trial, affording the 
plaintiff a substantial litigious advantage. 
                                                                                                             
 53. See Hooper v. Hooper, 941 So. 2d 726. 
 
 
